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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
This is an appeal from the Third Judicial District Court for 
Salt Lake County, State of Utah, involving a domestic relations 
case. Jurisdiction is proper in the Court of Appeals pursuant to 
Utah Code Anno. § 78-2a-3(2)(i) (1953), as amended. 
DETERMINATIVE STATUTES AND RULES 
I. Statutes. The interpretation of the following statute 
is determinative of the issue regarding attorney fees: 
Utah Code Anno. § 78-27-56(1) (1953), as amended: 
In civil actions, the court shall award reasonable 
attorney's fees to a prevailing party if the court 
determines that the action or defense to the action was 
without merit and not brought or asserted in good 
faith, except under Subsection (2). 
II. Rules. The interpretation of the following rule is of 
central importance to the issues on appeal: 
Utah Code of Judicial Administration, Rule 4-501(2): 
Motions for summary judgment. 
(a) Memorandum in support of a motion. The points 
and authorities in support of a motion for summary 
judgment shall begin with a section that contains a 
concise statement of material facts as to which movant 
contends no genuine issue exists. The facts shall be 
stated in separate numbered sentences and shall 
specifically refer to those portions of the record upon 
which the movant relies. 
(b) Memorandum in opposition to a motion. The 
points and authorities in opposition to a motion for 
summary judgment shall begin with a section that 
contains a concise statement of material facts as to 
which the party contends a genuine issue exists. Each 
disputed fact shall be stated in separate numbered 
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sentences and shall specifically refer to those 
portions of the record upon which the opposing party 
relies, and, if applicable, shall state the numbered 
sentence or sentences of the movant's facts that are 
disputed. All material facts set forth in the movant's 
statement and properly supported by an accurate 
reference-to the record shall be deemed admitted for 
the purpose of summary judgment unless specifically 
controverted by the opposing party's statement. 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
I. Introduction. Appellee, (hereafter Diane Jones), agrees 
with Appellant's, (hereafter Jack Jones), statement of the case. 
However, she disagrees with his statement of facts. 
Rule 27(a)(7), Utah R. App. P. requires that a statement of 
the facts, relevant to the issues presented for review, follow 
the statement of the case. Jack's statement of facts is 
inappropriate for two reasons. First, it contains facts which he 
did not rely on to oppose Diane's motion for summary judgment or 
to support his cross motion for summary judgment. Second, it 
contains facts which are irrelevant to the issues presented for 
review and which Diane contends are not true.1 
In the trial court, both parties submitted statements of 
*For example, Jack asserts that Diane committed to go to 
work after law school, that he paid for her education, that they 
lived frugally, and that Diane refused to work after finishing 
school. Diane's legal education was paid by grants through the 
State of Alaska and from the proceeds of the sale of their home 
in Alaska, where both parties worked. The parties also jointly 
agreed that Diane would stay home and raise their child. In any 
event, Jack's assertions are not pertinent to the issues on 
appeal. 
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facts they contended were undisputed and facts they contended 
were disputed, consistent with Rule 4-501, Utah Code of Judicial 
Administration. These are the only facts relied on by the 
parties to support and oppose the motions for summary judgment 
and are set forth hereafter. 
II. Facts Relating to the Petition to Terminate Alimony. 
Diane and Jack Jones were married July 1st, 1973. (R. 2) 
Their divorce was final September 23rd, 1992, terminating a 
nineteen year marriage. (R. 156-164) They have one minor child, 
Amber Jones, born September 3rd, 1979. (R. 2) 
Diane did not work outside the home for more than fifteen 
years before the parties separated. (R. 422) She attended the 
University of Utah School of Law from 1976 through 1979 and 
received her Juris Doctor decree in 1979. (R. 422-423) She 
became licensed to practice in 1979 but remained at home to raise 
the parties child. (R. 423). 
After the parties separated, Diane tried to find employment 
without success. Consequently, she borrowed money from her 
mother and began practicing law in January, 1992 as a sole 
practitioner. (R. 423) 
In the divorce, the trial court scheduled a pretrial for 
June 5th and a trial for June 11th, 1992. (R. 97) In 
preparation for the pretrial, Diane filed her financial 
declaration February 6th, 1992. In the declaration she itemized 
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$1,729 in monthly living expenses and $100 per month income. (R. 
81-88) Her income was from boarding horses on land adjacent to 
the marital home. In an attachment to the financial declaration, 
Diane disclosed the following: 
ATTACHMENT (INCOME) - Plaintiff was unemployed at the 
time of the parties' separation and had remained at 
home as a homemaker for 15 years. Plaintiff attempted 
for over a period of 6 months to find a position in 
either law practice or other areas. In January 1992, 
plaintiff entered into an office sharing arrangement in 
Midvale in order to try and generate some income and 
increase her practical experience. In order to enter 
the practice of law, plaintiff borrowed a substantial 
amount of money from family. To this date, plaintiff 
is running at a deficit but is making progress in 
covering her monthly expenses. She cannot project at 
what point her law practice will generate enough income 
to cover monthly expenses and repay start up costs. 
(R. 86) 
Jack also submitted his financial declaration disclosing his 
monthly income of $4,300. (R. 76-80) 
On March 17th, 1992, Jack served Diane with requests for 
admissions, requests for production of documents and 
interrogatories. (R. 99) Jack's discovery required Diane to 
itemize her business expenses in her law practice and the dollar 
amount of retainers received, in addition to producing her bank 
statements, deposit slips and checks from her business and 
personal accounts. She provided Jack with all of the requested 
information and documents on April 28th, 1992. (R. 423-424, 433-
438) 
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At the June 5th, 1992 pretrial, both parties were 
represented by attorneys. Jack produced his proposed trial 
exhibit entitled "Business Income & Expenses". (R. 424 & 439) 
This exhibit summarized Diane's income from her law practice for 
the first four months. (R. 439) It was prepared from the 
information and documents Diane previously produced for Jack. 
(R. 424) It showed that Diane's average monthly income after 
expenses from January through April, 1992, was $1,426.10. (R. 
4 39) However, Diane pointed out that Jack included the money she 
borrowed from her mother to start her practice. (R. 424) 
Jack and Diane also negotiated a settlement agreement which 
was read into the record. (R. 424-425) Within a few days after 
the pretrial, they discovered that they could not implement the 
agreement. They had agreed to a division of certain employment 
benefits through a qualified domestic relations order. However, 
these benefits could not be divided and secured to Diane's 
benefit through such an order; so they began renegotiating their 
agreement. (R. 425, 499) 
At that time, Diane's living expenses were the same as set 
forth in her February, 1992 financial declaration. (R. 425) 
These expenses included two payments on two trust deed notes 
secured against the marital home. (R. 425) They agreed to award 
the marital home to Diane. (R. 140, 425) They also negotiated a 
lump sum payment in lieu of the employment benefit they 
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discovered could not be divided through a qualified domestic 
relations order. The lump sum payment was $14,250. (R. 142-143, 
425) From Diane's standpoint, this payment was instrumental in 
the final alimony settlement because she intended to pay the 
second trust deed note off, thereby reducing her monthly expenses 
by $290, which she ultimately did. (R. 425-427) 
They also agreed that Jack would pay Diane $4 3 0 per month 
child support, based upon Jack's monthly income of $4,3 00 and 
Dianefs then $80 per month from boarding horses. (R. 138-139, 
425-42 6) However, Diane was no longer receiving any income from 
boarding horses. Her only income was from her law practice. (R. 
42 6) In the first settlement agreement, the parties decided that 
the land on which Diane was boarding horses would be sold and the 
proceeds awarded to Jack. When the parties negotiated their 
final agreement on September 1st, 1992, the land had already been 
sold. They used the old income figures for child support even 
though Diane was no longer receiving income from boarding horses. 
(R. 426-427) 
They also used the old income figures in their alimony 
agreement. The agreement was reduced to writing and signed on 
September 1st, 1992. (R. 137-146) The alimony agreement is set 
forth in paragraph 12 which states: 
The parties stipulate and agree that plaintiff's 
present monthly gross income is $80.00 and that 
defendant's gross monthly income from his employment is 
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$4,300. Based upon the respective parties1 income as 
set forth herein, it is stipulated and agreed that the 
defendant will pay to the plaintiff, alimony in the sum 
of Eight Hundred Dollars ($800.00) per month. It is 
further agreed, however, that at such time as Defendant 
has paid to Plaintiff the sums immediately due and 
owing to her under the terms of this agreement, a total 
amount of Fourteen Thousand Two Hundred and Fifty 
Dollars, (14,250.00), alimony shall be immediately 
reduced to the sum of Six Hundred and Fifty Dollars 
($650.00) per month. It is further agreed that 
defendant's obligation to pay alimony to the defendant 
shall terminate within five years from date of entry of 
a decree of divorce herein, or at such time as the 
Court may order, based upon a change in plaintiff's 
circumstances and plaintiff's ability to provide for 
her own support. 
It is stipulated and agreed that for purposes of 
determining defendant's continued obligation to pay 
alimony to plaintiff, plaintiff will provide to 
defendant at his request, through her counsel Ronald E. 
Kunz, copies of plaintiff's business records and tax 
returns, for purposes of determining plaintiff's 
continued need to receive alimony from the defendant. 
It is further agreed that defendant shall be entitled 
to receive such financial information from the 
plaintiff every six months, and such information shall 
be provided by plaintiff to the defendant within thirty 
days after receiving written request therefore. It is 
agreed that the defendant may petition the Court, by 
way of Motion, for a reduction in alimony payments and 
an adjustment of child support based on changes in the 
Plaintiff's income from time to time. 
(R. 143-144) 
Diane contends that alimony was negotiated based upon her 
earnings from her law practice since January, 1992, her 
anticipated earnings, child support, and her monthly expenses 
after paying the second trust deed note off. The parties did not 
attribute any income to Diane from her practice in the written 
agreement due to the short time she had been practicing law. So 
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they put her historical income from boarding horses, $80 per 
month, in the stipulated agreement. (R. 42 6-427) 
Diane considered all of the following in coming to the final 
alimony agreement: 
a. Diane's income from boarding horses was terminated 
because the land was sold and the proceeds awarded to Jack. 
b. After Jack paid Diane the lump sum of $14,250, Diane 
could pay the second trust deed note off, thereby reducing her 
minimum monthly expenses from $1,729.10 to $1,439.10. The 
agreement to reduce the alimony from $800 to $650 per month after 
payment of the lump sum accommodated this reduction in Diane's 
living expenses. 
c. The alimony and child support combined came to $1,080 
per month, which was less than Diane's minimum monthly living 
expenses. But Diane considered her past income from her law 
practice and her expected earnings in the future. Diane agreed 
to $650 per month alimony because the child support and alimony, 
plus her income from her practice, would enable her to meet her 
minimum monthly living expenses plus allow extra to maintain the 
standard of living she and her child enjoyed during the marriage. 
d. The alimony would terminate no later than five years 
from the date of entry of the divorce decree to give Diane the 
assistance she needed to build her practice and ease her 
transition into her career as an attorney, while maintaining her 
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and her child's standard of living. (R. 426-427) 
Jack contends on the other hand that he agreed to $650 per 
month alimony and $43 0 per month child support because Diane 
represented in the negotiations that she was earning only $80 per 
month, insisted her law practice was running at a loss and had no 
income, and because she was receiving a substantial property 
settlement for her support. (R. 499-500) Diane disputes that 
any of the foregoing were considerations. 
Diane was not earning $80 per month. The land from which 
she was deriving this income had already been sold and the 
proceeds awarded to Jack. (R. 426, 530) 
The only time that Diane represented that her law practice 
was running a deficit was in February, 1992, in her financial 
declaration. (R. 86) At that time she had been in practice one 
month. (R. 423) At the June, 1992 pretrial conference, Jack had 
Diane's business records which showed that she was earning 
income. Jack prepare his proposed trial exhibit showing Diane's 
income, although it was overstated. (R. 423-424, 439) Both 
parties were fully aware of Diane's income from her practice when 
the final alimony agreement was negotiated on September 1st, 
1992. However, they did not attribute any income to Diane due to 
the short time she had been in practice. (R. 426) 
In addition, the property settlement Diane was to receive in 
the divorce had no bearing on alimony. (R. 557-558) She was not 
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awarded any income producing property. (R. 557-558) The total 
marital estate was worth approximately $200,000, consisting of: 
1) The marital home with equity of approximately $45,000; 2) 2.48 
acres in South Jordan, Utah, with equity of approximately 
$50,000; 3) 46.89 acres in Colorado with equity of approximately 
$10,000; 4) Pacificorp retirement account worth over $50,000; 5) 
1,232 share of Pacificorp stock worth over $30,000; and, 6) 
Pacificorp deferred compensation plan worth approximately 
$50,000. Diane was awarded the marital home and Jack was awarded 
all the proceeds from the sale of the 2.48 acres in South Jordan. 
The residence does not produce income. Jack was awarded the 
46.89 acres in Colorado subject to a lien in Diane's favor for 
only $2,000. Diane's lien does not provide her with any income. 
Diane was awarded one half the Pacificorp retirement pursuant to 
a QDRO which does not provide income until retirement. Jack paid 
Diane $14,250 in lieu of dividing the over $30,000 in Pacificorp 
stock and the Pacificorp deferred compensation plan worth 
approximately $50,000. The $14,250 was used in part to pay off 
the second trust deed note, leaving a balance of $6,700 in cash. 
Of the marital estate worth approximately $200,000, Jack received 
property worth approximately $131,250 and Diane received property 
worth approximately $68,750. Other than $6,700 in cash, all the 
property Diane received does not provide any income. (R. 557-
558) 
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Moreover, Jack admits that Diane's income from her law 
practice was contemplated by them at the time alimony was agreed 
to. He states in his affidavit dated April 9th, 1993: "Plaintiff 
is currently a member in good standing with the Utah State Bar. 
When the divorce was first entered alimony was awarded to give 
Plaintiff assistance so that she could have time to build up a 
practice and to ease her transition into her career as an 
attorney." (R. 222-227) He made the same statement under oath 
in his affidavit dated June 10th, 1993. (R. 243-245) 
The parties final settlement conference was September 1st, 
1992. At the conference the parties finally settled all of the 
issues. (R. 178-179) A written settlement agreement was signed 
that day and incorporated into the findings of fact, conclusions 
of law and divorce decree. The decree was entered September 
23rd, 1992. (R. 147-164) 
Jack made his first written request for Diane's business 
records November 25th, 1992, one month after entry of the decree. 
(R. 183, 428, 448) Under the decree Jack is only entitled to 
request her records every six months. Diane responded December 
17th, 1992 and again on January 4th, 1993, pointing out that his 
request was premature and that he was also behind in his support 
payments. (R. 184-186, 428, 449-451) Jack, however, was 
insistent. On January 29th, 1993, four months after entry of the 
decree, he filed a motion asking the trial court to order Diane 
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to produce her records within thirty days. (R. 169-172) He then 
amended the motion on February 4th, 1993 to request that Diane 
produce her records in ten days. (R. 173-174) On February 16th, 
1993, the court denied Jack's motion and ordered him to pay Diane 
$150 attorney fees for having to defend a spurious motion. (R. 
187-190) 
Jack made his second written request on March 1st, 1993. 
(R. 428) Diane produced her business records and 1992 tax 
return. (R. 428) Jack then filed his petition to terminate 
alimony June 18th, 1993, eight and one half months after the 
decree was entered. (R. 240-242) 
In support of his petition, Jack calculated that Diane's 
average monthly income for 1992 was $872.12, and that her average 
monthly income from September, 1992 through February, 1993 was 
$1,4 08.18. This figure was calculated by deducting her normal 
business expenses, except car expenses and depreciation, from her 
gross receipts. (R. 240-271) 
Diane's average monthly income from her practice in 1993, 
less reasonable business expenses was $1,773 before taxes. After 
taxes, it was $1,303.42. (R. 429, 481) Her average monthly 
income for the first seven months of 1994, less reasonable 
business expenses was $1,867.54. After taxes, it was $1,397.54. 
(R. 429-430, 481) However, her income has been inconsistent from 
month to month, ranging from a deficit of $774.39 in one month to 
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gross receipts of $8,663.54 in another month. (R. 430-431) Her 
present average living expenses are $2,221 per month. (R. 430) 
Jack's income has increased from $4,3 00 per month at the 
time of the divorce to approximately $5,070 per month. (R. 636) 
Jack contends that Diane is now living beyond the standard 
of living they enjoyed during their marriage because her expenses 
include $584 per month in car expenses, an increase of $484 per 
month over her car expenses at the time of the divorce. (R. 480-
481, 501) During their marriage, the parties purchased numerous 
vehicles, some of which were new, others of which were 1 or 2 
years old. For example, they purchased a new AMC Javelin in 
1973. They also bought a Triumph TR-7 which was only 1 or 2 
years old. They purchased a Ford Thunderbird which was 
relatively new and purchased a new Hyundai Excel off the showroom 
floor, among other vehicles. (R. 501, 558-559) 
In the divorce, Diane was awarded a 12 year old Buick and a 
14 year old truck. Both were paid off. Jack, on the other hand 
was awarded a 2 to 3 year old Ford Taurus. (R. 43 0, 559 After 
the divorce Diane's truck and Buick became unreliable. In fact, 
Diane missed one court appearance due to the Buick's 
unreliability. As a result, she replaced the 1980 Buick with a 
used, 1992 Ford Explorer. Her monthly payments are $385 per 
month. With gas and maintenance, her average monthly car expense 
is $584. (R. 430, 558-559) 
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Diane has been in practice a relatively short time. Her 
practice has not developed to the point where she can rely on 
stable income each month. If the alimony were terminated, she 
would not be able to meet her monthly living expenses or support 
herself and her child consistent with the standard of living they 
enjoyed during the marriage. Diane still needs assistance by way 
of alimony to continue to build up a practice with stable income 
and ease her transition into her career as an attorney. (R. 430-
431, 559) 
III. Facts Relating to the Attorney Fee Issue. 
In order to finance the defense against Jack's petition to 
terminate alimony, Diane entered into an agreement with her 
attorney to trade services. Diane represented her attorney in 
his divorce in exchange for his services in representing Diane. 
They agreed that their respective services would be valued at the 
rate of $100 per hour. Diane's attorney's divorce is concluded. 
The total time Diane incurred in representing him was 28 hours, 
or $2,800. This amount has been offset, dollar for dollar, 
against the time Diane's attorney is incurring in this case. 
However, the time that Diane's attorney has incurred, and is 
continuing to incur, exceeds the 28 hours she traded. Thus, 
after crediting the 28 hours Diane spent representing her 
attorney, she is now indebted to him for the difference. (R. 
680, 697-698) 
14 
Jack also contends that he has made many attempts to settle 
this case but that Diane has refused to enter into any meaningful 
negotiations. (R. 501-502) The record shows otherwise. Jack 
has only offered to terminate alimony altogether. (R. 390) In 
approximately May, 1994, Jack offered to terminate alimony in 
exchange for which he would not seek a retroactive modification. 
In October, 1994, he made the same offer. Commissioner Michael 
Evans recommended that alimony be reduced $80 to $100 per month, 
but insisted on termination; so Commissioner Evans certified that 
issue for trial. (R. 390) Based on Commissioner Evans 
recommendation, Diane offered to reduce the alimony $80 per month 
effective October, 1994. However, Jack refused to consider any 
reduction whatsoever. (R. 559-561) 
Jack further contends that Diane has taken every opportunity 
to delay the proceedings, causing him to incur substantial 
attorney fees. (R. 501-502) Again, the record establishes that 
Jack refused to reasonably cooperate in discovery, falsified 
information, and increased Diane's attorney fees needlessly. The 
record also demonstrates that Jack never intended to honor the 
alimony agreement and, instead, intended to take every action 
immediately to seek its termination. This is shown by the 
following: 
a. Jack first requested Diane's records one month 
after the decree was entered, even though the decree explicitly 
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provides that he is only entitled to the records every six 
months. He went so far as to file an order to show cause to 
obtain the records before the six months. At the hearing, the 
court found that the motion was without merit, and awarded 
attorney fees against Jack. (R. 169-174, 183-190, 428, 449-451) 
b. On March 25th, 1993, Diane was forced to file an 
Order to Show Cause to restrain Jack from harassing and 
threatening her. On March 12th, 1993, Jack called Diane and said 
that the alimony was "immoral" and that he "would end it once and 
for all, you're going to make me do something insane. Watch your 
Back." The restraining order was granted. (R. 196-213, 228-232) 
c. Jack regrets having ever agreed to the payment of 
alimony and wishes he had gone to trial instead. (R. 497-498) 
d. Jack filed his petition to terminate alimony on 
June 18th, 1993, eight and one half months after the decree was 
entered. Karl Mangum was his attorney. Diane voluntarily 
accepted service and immediately answered the petition. (R. 238-
242) 
e. On June 22nd, 1993, Diane served Jack with 
discovery. Jack did not respond and did not seek an extension. 
Consequently she sent a letter demanding his answers within ten 
days. (R. 562, 576) Jack finally answered the discovery, but 
failed to provide much of the information. Consequently, on 
August 24th, 1993, Diane sent Jack's attorney a letter requesting 
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the missing information. Jack did not respond. (R. 277, 563, 
577) Instead, on August 31st, 1993, he filed a certificate of 
readiness for trial. (R. 278, 563) 
f. Because the discovery was incomplete, Diane 
objected to the certificate of readiness for the trial and filed 
a motion to compel which was set for hearing on October 19th, 
1993. Diane also sent another letter requesting that Jack 
provide the missing information. (R. 279-310, 563, 580) 
g. Jack's attorney, Karl Mangum, withdrew on October 
15th, 1994. Harry Caston entered his appearance. (R. 314-317) 
After discussing the pending objection and motion to compel, the 
parties entered into a written agreement continuing the hearing 
without date and obligating Jack, under court order, to provide 
the missing information within 10 days of the date the agreement 
was signed. (R. 326-333, 563-564) 
h. Jack failed to comply with the agreement. 
Consequently, on December 8th, 1993, Diane was forced to file an 
Order to Show Cause in re Contempt to force Jack to provide the 
missing information. The Order to Show Cause was set for hearing 
on December 28th, 1993. In addition, Diane sent another letter 
to Jack's attorney attempting to resolve Jack's refusal to comply 
with the agreement. (R. 334-351, 564, 614-616) 
i. On December 17th, 1993, Jack provided supplemental 
answers to the discovery. (R. 3 52) However, some of the 
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information was still missing. On December 21st, 1993, Diane sent 
Jack's attorney another letter to attempt to solve this problem. 
Jack's attorney promised that the missing information would be 
provided, so Diane cancelled the December 28th, 1993 hearing. 
(R. 564, 617) 
j. On January 4th, 1994, Jack amended his petition 
twice. Diane cooperated fully in allowing the amendments without 
a hearing and immediately answered the amended petitions. (R. 
356-368, 564) 
k. On March 7th, 1994, Harry Caston withdrew as Jack's 
attorney. On March 18th, 1994, Jeff B. Skoubye appeared as 
Jack's new attorney. (R. 369-374) 
1. In March, 1994, the parties agreed to exchange 1993 
tax returns, rather than pursue formal discovery. Diane gave 
Jack her 1993 return on May 5th, 1994, and requested Jack's. He 
only provided his bare tax return without any supporting 
schedules or W-2's. On May 16th, 1994, he gave Diane the 
schedules and W-2's. The The tax return and W-2 showed wages of 
$54,351. (R. 565, 618-630) 
m. In preparation for a pretrial conference, Jack 
filed his financial declaration dated June 10th, 1994, 
representing, under oath, that his gross monthly income was 
$4,550, consistent with his 1993 W-2 and tax return previously 
given to Diane. He also claimed monthly expenses of $3,74 5, in 
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addition to alimony and child support in this case. (R. 379-383) 
n. Immediately prior to the pretrial conference, it 
came to Diane's attention that Jack falsified his 1993 tax return 
and W-2 and lied about his income in his financial declaration. 
(R. 565) Diane notified Jack's attorney. The day before the 
pretrial, Jack handdelivered his correct 1993 tax return and W-2 
and a corrected financial declaration dated July 19th, 1994 
showing that his true income was over $5070 per month. At the 
pretrial, Jack's attorney stated that he instructed his client 
not to engage in this kind of conduct again. (R. 391-395, 565-
566, 636-652) 
o. Jack did not pursue any discovery until August 
15th, 1994. Diane answered timely. (R. 398, 566) 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
I. The Mere Existence of Genuine Issues of Fact Does 
Not Preclude the Entry of Summary Judgment. 
In reviewing a summary judgment, the Court of Appeals 
applies the same analytical standard required of the trial court. 
Summary judgment is not precluded whenever some fact remains in 
dispute, just when genuine material facts pertinent to the issues 
are in dispute. This is a case where Jack's disputed facts are 
immaterial to the resolution of this case. 
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II. Summary Judgment Was Proper Because Diane's Income From Her 
Law Practice Was Contemplated Within The Decree And Jack 
Failed To Establish Any Genuine Issue Of Fact To The 
Contrary. 
On a petition to modify alimony, the moving party must first 
show a substantial change of circumstances since the decree that 
was not contemplated in the decree itself. The burden with 
respect to modifications based on a stipulated settlement is 
particularly high. 
Jack claims that Diane's income from her law practice is not 
contemplated in the decree and constitutes a substantial change 
in her financial circumstances. He relies solely on the 
statement in the stipulated settlement agreement concerning 
Diane's historical income at the time. That does not determine 
the issue of whether future income was contemplated. 
The court must consider evidence concerning the 
contemplation of the parties and decree as to Diane's income from 
her law practice. The undisputed facts and language from the 
stipulated agreement show the parties contemplation of Diane's 
future income at the time the alimony agreement was made. 
Jack's reliance on the statement in the stipulated 
settlement agreement reciting Diane's historical income from 
boarding horses ignores the undisputed facts and language of the 
decree and does not create a genuine issue as to the 
contemplation of Diane's future income from her law practice. 
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The doctrine of res judicata has no application to the facts 
of this case. The doctrine of res judicata precludes the 
relitigation of all issues that could have been litigated as 
well as those that were litigated. The parties stipulated that 
Diane's "present" income at the time of the divorce was her 
historical income from boarding horses. It has no bearing on the 
issue of the contemplation of Diane's anticipated income from her 
law practice. Consequently there is no relitigation of that 
issue. 
III. Summary Judgment Was Proper Because Jack Failed 
To Show Any Genuine Issue of Fact as to a Substantial 
Change in Diane's Financial Circumstances or as to 
Diane's Ability to Support Herself. 
The financial facts pertaining to Diane's income and 
expenses are undisputed. Her annual income has increased only 
$5,000 to $7,000 which is not a substantial change of 
circumstances. Jack failed to show any genuine issue of fact 
pertinent to this issue. 
Jack claims that Diane insisted she was not making money in 
her practice during their negotiations. Diane disputes this. 
Even if Jack's claim is true, the undisputed facts show that 
alimony and child support were not enough to cover Diane's 
monthly living expenses, she was not awarded any income producing 
assets, Jack had her business records showing income, Diane had 
been in practice the previous eight months, and the alimony 
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agreement centers its provisions around Diane's income from her 
law practice. Consequently, Jack's issue, even if true, is 
immaterial to resolution of the case. 
Jack also raises an issue that Diane earns enough money to 
provide for her own support, centering his claim on a car expense 
which he contends is extravagant. However, the undisputed facts 
show that Jack and Diane bought numerous vehicles during the 
marriage, some of which were new and some of which were only 1 to 
2 years old. Even deducting this car expense, the undisputed 
facts show that Diane is not making enough to provide for her own 
support. The undisputed facts also show that Jack's claim that 
Diane's car expense is beyond the standard of living enjoyed by 
them during the marriage is simply a bare allegation unsupported 
by the facts. 
Consequently, those facts that Jack contends were genuinely 
disputed, taken as a whole, do not preclude the entry of summary 
IV. The Trial Court Did Not Err in Finding That Jack's 
Litigation Was Without Merit and Brought in 
Bad Faith and in Awarding Attorney Fees to Diane. 
The facts concerning Jack's litigation establish each of the 
elements necessary for an award of attorney fees under Section 
78-27-56. These facts consist of the following: 
1. Diane prevailed. 
2. After the decree was entered, Jack harassed and 
threatened Diane stating that his payment of alimony was immoral 
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and that he "would end it once and for all, you're going to make 
me do something insane. Watch your back." 
3. The decree provided that Jack was entitled to Diane's 
records from her law practice every six months. Only one month 
after entry of the decree, Jack made demand for her records. He 
then filed a motion four months after the decree was entered to 
compel the production of her records, resulting in sanctions 
being assessed against him for a spurious action. 
4. Diane produced her records in March, 1993. Then Jack 
filed his petition to terminate the alimony only eight and one 
half months after the decree was entered. 
5. Jack never considered or offered a reduction in alimony 
before the trial court and consistently insisted on complete, 
retroactive termination, even after Commissioner Evans 
recommendation that alimony be reduced $80 to $100. The only 
relief Jack sought on his cross motion for summary judgment was 
complete termination of alimony. 
6. Jack objects to the payment of alimony, regrets that he 
agreed to pay alimony, wishing instead that he had gone to trial 
7. The plain language of the decree and the facts at the 
time of the divorce show that Diane's income from her practice 
was contemplated by the parties and in the decree. Jack's 
position that it was never contemplated is untenable. 
8. During the litigation, Jack refused to reasonable 
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cooperate in Diane's discovery requests. 
9. During the litigation, Jack refused to honor a written 
agreement and a court order designed to remedy his refusal to 
completely answer Diane's discovery and expedite the case. 
10. During the litigation, Jack falsified his 1993 tax 
returns and W-2 and filed a false financial declaration with the 
court, signed under oath. 
11. Jack went through multiple attorneys during the 
litigation. 
12. Jack did not pursue any discovery on his own behalf 
until one year and two months after he filed his petition. 
Based upon the foregoing, all the necessary requirements 
under Section 78-27-56 for an award of attorney fees have been 
met. Diane prevailed in the action. The claim was without merit 
and brought in bad faith. The trial court's judgment in this 
regard is not clearly erroneous. 
Jack claims that Diane did not incur any fees because she 
agreed with her attorney to trade services on a dollar for dollar 
basis. The trade of services is a legitimate transaction for 
valuable consideration and is time that Diane and her attorney 
could have spent for paying clients. Trade of services provides 
a legitimate basis for the trial court's determination that Diane 
has incurred attorney fees in her case. 
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ARGUMENT 
I. THE MERE EXISTENCE OF GENUINE ISSUES OF FACT DOES 
NOT PRECLUDE THE ENTRY OF SUMMARY JUDGMENT. 
In reviewing a summary judgment, the Court of Appeals 
applies the same analytical standard required of the trial court. 
Lucky Seven Rodeo Corp. v. Clark, 755 P.2d 750, 752 (Utah App. 
1988) . That standard dictates that the facts must be liberally 
construed and the evidence viewed in a light most favorable to 
the party opposing the motion. Id. Summary judgment is 
appropriate if the pleadings and all other submissions show that 
there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the 
moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Utah R. 
Civ. P., Rule 56. 
Summary judgment is not precluded, however, whenever some 
fact remains in dispute, only when material facts are genuinely 
controverted. Hecrlar Ranch, Inc. v. Stillman, 619 P. 2d 1390, 
1391 (Utah 1980). In Horqan v. Industrial Design Corp.. 657 P.2d 
751, 752 (Utah 1982), the Utah Supreme Court explained that ". . 
. the mere existence of genuine issues of fact in the case as a 
whole does not preclude the entry of summary judgment if those 
issues are immaterial to resolution of the case." In Salt Lake 
City Corp. v. James Constructors, 761 P.2d 42, 45 (Utah App. 
1988) this Court further explained that when it appears there is 
no reasonable probability that the party moved against could 
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prevail, summary judgment should be granted. 
In his petition to terminate alimony, Jack had the 
threshold requirement of showing a substantial change in Diane's 
financial circumstances since the divorce that was not 
contemplated within the decree. He contends that Diane's income 
from her law practice is not contemplated within the decree and 
constitutes a substantial change warranting the termination of 
alimony.2 The trial court found that Diane's income from 
practicing law was contemplated at the time of the divorce and 
within the decree and that there is not a substantial change in 
her income. 
On appeal, Jack has the added burden of showing a genuine 
issue of fact on this point. While Jack may have shown some 
genuine issues of fact, this is a case where his disputed facts 
are immaterial to the resolution of this case. The trial court 
did not err because, even considering Jack's issues, he failed to 
show any reasonable probability of prevailing at trial. 
II. SUMMARY JUDGMENT WAS PROPER BECAUSE DIANE'S INCOME FROM HER 
LAW PRACTICE WAS CONTEMPLATED WITHIN THE DECREE AND JACK 
FAILED TO ESTABLISH ANY GENUINE ISSUE OF FACT TO THE 
CONTRARY. 
On a petition to modify alimony, the moving party must first 
2In Jack's cross motion for summary judgment, he asked for 
judgment completely terminating alimony. He never asked the 
trial court to consider the issue of reducing alimony. 
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show a substantial change of circumstances since the decree that 
was not contemplated in the decree itself. In Moore v. Moore, 
872 P.2d 1054, 1055 (Utah App. 1994), this Court explained this 
rule of law as follows: 
On a petition for a modification of a divorce decree, 
the threshold requirement for relief is a showing of a 
substantial change of circumstances occurring since the 
entry of the decree and not contemplated in the decree 
itself. 236 Utah Adv. Rep. at 27, [citing Purfee v. 
Durfee, 796 P.2d 713, 716 (Utah App. 1990)(emphasis 
added)(quoting Stettler v. Stettler, 713 P.2d 699, 701 
(Utah 1985)]. 
The Utah Supreme Court has further held that the burden with 
respect to modifications of divorce decrees based on stipulated 
settlement agreements, as is the case here, is particularly high. 
Lea v. Bowers, 658 P.2d 1213, 1215 (Utah 1983). 
As explained previously, Jack claimed that Diane's income 
from her law practice is not contemplated in the decree and 
constitutes a substantial change in her financial circumstances. 
To support this claim, Jack relied solely on the statement in the 
stipulated settlement agreement to the effect that the parties 
alimony agreement is based upon Diane's present income of $80 per 
month and Jack's present income of $4,300 per month.3 However, a 
3The pertinent language from paragraph 12 of the agreement 
reads: "The parties stipulate and agree that plaintiff's present 
gross monthly income is $80.00 and that defendant's gross monthly 
income from his employment is $4,300. Based upon the respective 
parties' income as set forth herein, it is stipulated and agreed 
that the defendant will pay to the plaintiff, alimony . . . " 
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recitation stating the parties present income at the time of the 
divorce does not determine the issue of whether future income was 
contemplated. Rather, as shown by the following cases, the court 
must consider the evidence concerning the contemplation of the 
parties and the decree as to future income. 
In Moore vs. Moore, 872 P.2d 1054, the parties were married 
sixteen years and had three children at the time the decree was 
entered. The decree was based upon the parties stipulation and 
property settlement agreement. At the time of the divorce the 
parties1 adjusted gross income was $40,996, the majority of which 
was Mr. Moore's income. Mrs. Moore was employed part time for 
five dollars per hour. Also, at the time of the divorce, the 
parties discussed Mrs. Moore's plan to recertify as a school 
teacher or to obtain a master's degree in sociology - - although 
this discussion and plan, or any mention of Mrs. Moore's 
contemplated future income, were not set forth in the agreement, 
the findings of fact, or the decree of divorce. 
In the decree Mr. Moore was required to pay $1,150 per month 
alimony during the first year following the divorce and $1,050 
per month thereafter. He was also ordered to pay $750 per month 
child support. 
In October, 1989, he filed his petition for modification of 
the decree asking that his alimony be terminated. The trial 
court decided that a substantial change of material circumstances 
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had occurred because the parties1 children were emancipated and 
Mrs. Moore had a stable income. The trial court specifically 
found that she had an income of $1,373 per month, the same amount 
she would have earned if she had been employed as a school 
teacher at the time of the divorce. The court also found that 
she had reasonable monthly expenses of $2,783.87. Based on these 
findings, the court granted Mr. Moore's petition and reduced the 
alimony from $1,050 per month to one dollar per month beginning 
November, 1992. 
This Court reversed and remanded for reinstatement of the 
original $1050 alimony award.4 After analyzing the trial court's 
findings, this Court held that the fact that Mrs. Moore presently 
has a stable income cannot be considered a change of 
circumstances, stating: 
The parties obviously contemplated that Mrs. Moore 
would earn approximately $1300 at the time the divorce 
decree was entered. Mrs. Moore's stable level of 
income was anticipated at the time of the divorce when 
the original alimony award was set. Thus, the court 
incorrectly determined that Mrs. Moore's present, 
stable income was a substantial change in her material 
circumstances. 
872 P.2d at 1056. 
In Dana v. Dana, 789 P.2d 726 (Utah App. 1990) this Court 
4
 The Court of Appeals did not address the issue of whether a 
child reaching majority constitutes a substantial, material 
change in circumstances. 
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again considered evidence of the parties contemplation at the 
time of the divorce, even though the decree was silent on the 
issue of anticipated future income. In that case, the parties 
were divorced in January, 1983. Mrs. Dana was earning $3,000 per 
year babysitting in her home. Mr. Dana was earning $21,000 per 
year. He was ordered to pay $165 per month per child as child 
support. In 1987, he filed a petition to reduce his child 
support based upon Mrs. Dana's increase in annual income to 
$17,000 per year, plus his own added obligation to support two 
additional children after the divorce. The trial court found a 
substantial change of circumstances due to Mrs. Dana's increased 
income from $3,000 per year to $17,000 per year, and Mr. Dana's 
additional child support responsibility. 
This Court reversed, holding: 
The court's conclusion that plaintiff's increase of 
annual earnings from $3,000 in 1983 to $17,000 in 1987 
constitutes a substantial change in circumstances is 
erroneous. It ignores the defendant's testimony that, 
at the time of the divorce decree, the court 
anticipated plaintiff would increase her earnings from 
$10,000 to $12,000 shortly after the divorce, by 
finding outside employment. A change of circumstances 
reasonably contemplated at the time of divorce is not 
legally cognizable as a substantial change in 
circumstances in modification proceedings. Based on 
the Court's reasonable anticipation of plaintiff's 
earnings, her income increased by only $5,000 to 
$7,000, and not $14,000 during the five years following 
the divorce. 
789 P.2d at 729, (emphasis added). 
In this case, Jack's reliance on the parties recitation of 
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Dianefs historical income from boarding horses, $80 per month, 
does not address the issue of whether Diane's future income from 
her law practice was reasonable contemplated. Instead, the 
undisputed facts concerning the parties contemplation and 
financial circumstances at the time of the divorce, and the 
language of the stipulated agreement, conclusively show that 
Diane's future income was anticipated. The undisputed facts and 
language from the stipulated agreement that show this include the 
following: 
1. Jack admits in his April 9th, 1993 affidavit, and his 
June 10th, 1993 affidavit: "When the divorce was first entered 
alimony was awarded to give Plaintiff assistance so that she 
could have time to build up a practice and to ease her transition 
into her career as an attorney." 
2. The stipulated agreement provides a maximum time frame 
of five years for payment of alimony, which is a clear indication 
that the parties contemplated an appropriate time period for 
Diane to establish a stable income from her practice at a level 
sufficient for her to provide for her own support. 
3. At the time of the divorce, Jack was aware that Diane 
had been practicing law the previous eight months. This was 
disclosed in Diane's February, 1992 financial declaration. Jack 
also had all of Diane's business records from her practice by the 
end of April, 1992. 
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4. At the pretrial in June, 1992, Jack knew Diane was then 
earning income in her practice. He prepared a proposed trial 
exhibit showing Diane's income of $1,42 6.10 per month after 
deducting business expenses. 
5. At the time of the divorce, Diane's monthly living 
expenses were $1,439.10. The agreed upon alimony and child 
support came to $1,080 per month, an amount insufficient for 
Diane to meet her monthly expenses unless her income from her law 
practice was contemplated. Additionally, Diane's property 
settlement did not include any income producing assets to 
supplement her support. 
6. The stipulated agreement and the decree clearly 
contemplate Diane's future income because it provides that 
alimony may terminate sooner than five years upon the showing of 
a change in Diane's financial circumstances and her ability to 
provide for her own support.5 
7. The decree also contemplates Diane's future income 
because it provides for Jack's right to request her business 
records from her law practice every six months upon written 
request and for his right to petition the court by way of motion 
5This provision of paragraph 13 of the decree reads: 
"Defendant's obligation to pay alimony to the plaintiff shall 
terminate within five years from the entry of a decree of divorce 
herein, or at such time as the Court may order, based upon a 
change in plaintiff's circumstances and plaintiff's ability to 
provide for her own support." 
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for a reduction in alimony payments based on changes in her 
income from time to time.6 
8. The land from which Diane was deriving income of $80 per 
month boarding horses during the divorce had been sold, 
terminating that income. 
The foregoing is undisputed. Nevertheless, Jack relies on 
the statement in the stipulated settlement agreement reciting 
Diane's historical income from boarding horses. That statement 
does not address the contemplation of the decree, or the parties, 
concerning Diane's active practice of law and her income from her 
practice at the time. The statement identifying Diane's income 
from boarding horses, which had terminated, simply does not 
6This provision from paragraph 13 of the decree reads: "It 
is stipulated and agreed that for purposes of determining 
defendant's continued obligation to pay alimony to plaintiff, 
plaintiff will provide to defendant at his request, through her 
counsel Ronald E. Kunz, copies of plaintiff's business records 
and tax returns, for purposes of determining plaintiff's 
continued need to receive alimony from the defendant. It is 
further agreed that defendant shall be entitled to receive such 
financial information from the plaintiff every six months, and 
such information shall be provided by plaintiff to the defendant 
within thirty days after receiving written request therefore. It 
is agreed that the defendant may petition the Court, by way of 
Motion, for a reduction in alimony payments and an adjustment of 
child support based on changes in the Plaintiff's income from 
time to time." 
Jack never asked for a reduction in alimony. At the 
pretrial settlement conference before Commissioner Evans, he 
refused to consider any option but a complete termination of 
alimony. (R. 390) Likewise, in his cross motion for summary 
judgment he was requesting judgment that alimony be completely 
terminated retroactively. 
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create a genuine issue as to the contemplation of Dianefs future 
income from her law practice. It was clearly contemplated. 
Moreover, Jack's argument that the doctrine of res judicata 
prohibits the consideration of anything but the statement 
concerning Diane's historical income from boarding horses has no 
application to the facts of this case. The doctrine of res 
judicata precludes the relitigation of all issues that could 
have been litigated as well as those that were litigated. Estate 
of Covington v. Josephson, 888 P.2d 675, (Utah App. 1994). The 
parties stipulated that Diane's "present" income at the time of 
the divorce was her historical income from boarding horses. This 
recitation of her "present" income has no bearing on the issue of 
the contemplation of Diane's anticipated income from her law 
practice. The undisputed facts and the language of the decree 
center on Diane's future income from her law practice, as the 
trial court found, not on Diane's historical income cited in the 
agreement. Consequently, that issue is not being relitigated. 
The trial court also found from the undisputed facts that 
the parties did anticipate that Diane was commencing a law 
practice, that she had not been in extensive work up to the time 
of the divorce, and that Jack would know what her income was from 
her law practice every six months. (R. 708) The trial court's 
decision was premised on the undisputed facts and language from 
the decree, itemized above. Jack's reliance on the statement 
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concerning Diane's historical income from boarding horses does 
not establish any genuine issue of fact concerning the 
contemplation of Diane's future income. 
III. SUMMARY JUDGMENT WAS PROPER BECAUSE JACK FAILED 
TO SHOW ANY GENUINE ISSUE OF FACT AS TO A SUBSTANTIAL 
CHANGE IN DIANE'S FINANCIAL CIRCUMSTANCES OR AS TO 
DIANE'S ABILITY TO SUPPORT HERSELF. 
Given the undisputed facts and the language from the 
stipulated settlement agreement, Jack nevertheless bears the 
burden of showing a substantial change in Diane's financial 
circumstances not reasonably contemplated at the time of the 
divorce. Moore vs. Moore, 872 P.2d 1054. However, Jack failed 
to establish any genuine issue of fact pertaining to this issue. 
The following financial facts are undisputed: 
1. Jack's, June 1992 proposed trial exhibit attributes 
Diane with $1,426.10 monthly income from her law practice, after 
deducting expenses, although it was overstated. Her actual 
annual income for 1992 was $10,465, ($872.12 per month). Her 
actual monthly income from September, 1992 through February, 1993 
was $1,408.18. (R. 244) 
2. Diane's annual income in 1993, after taxes and business 
expenses was $15,641, ($1,303.42 per month). 
3. Her income for the first seven months in 1994, after 
taxes and business expenses, was $9,782.78, ($1,397.54 per 
month). 
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4. In 1993, Diane's income increased only $5,000 over what 
she actually made in 1992, although it did not increase over the 
amount Jack attributed to her in his June, 1992 trial exhibit, or 
from what she made from September, 1992 through February, 1993. 
5. In 1994, Diane's income increased only $6,000 over what 
she actually made in 1992, although it did not increase over the 
amount Jack attributed to her in his June, 1992 trial exhibit, or 
from what she made from September, 1992 through February, 1993. 
6. Diane's income is not yet stable or consistent, ranging 
from a loss of $774 in one month to receipts of $8,663 in another 
month. 
7. Her current monthly living expenses come to $2,221, 
which include a $389 payment on a used 1992 Ford Explorer she 
purchased to replace a 12 year old Buick she was awarded in the 
divorce. Her average income from 1993 and 1994, $1,350 per 
month, is not sufficient to cover her expenses. 
In the Dana case, 789 P.2d 726, this Court held that 
"parties to a divorce decree will undoubtedly experience economic 
and other changes following a divorce, but a modification in the 
decree is justified only when a party shows a substantial change 
in circumstances." This Court went on to hold that an increase 
in annual income of only $5,000 to $7000 is not a substantial 
change in circumstances. Likewise, the increase in Diane's 
annual income of only $5,000 to $7,000 is not a substantial 
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change of circumstances. 
Consistent with the Dana case, supra, the trial court also 
found that Diane's income since the divorce was undisputed and 
that there had not been a sufficient change of circumstances to 
warrant the termination of alimony. (R. 709). Given the 
undisputed facts, the trial court did not err in granting summary 
judgment to Diane. Jack simply failed to show any genuine issue 
of fact pertinent to this issue. 
Jack identifies some issues which he contends are genuinely 
disputed. As explained previously however, the mere existence of 
genuine issues of fact in the case as a whole does not preclude 
the entry of summary judgment if those issues are immaterial to 
resolution of the case. Horgan v. Industrial Design Corp., 657 
P.2d 751. Those issues that Jack contends are genuinely disputed 
are immaterial to the resolution of this case. 
One such issue is Jack's claim that during the negotiations, 
Diane insisted she was not making money in her practice, and that 
alimony was based solely on this representation with no 
contemplation or anticipation of her future income.7 Diane 
disputes this and claims that she discussed hpr income with Jack 
7This is not a genuinely disputed fact in light of the 
undisputed evidence concerning Jack's June, 1992 trial exhibit, 
the fact that Diane was in practice at least eight months at the 
time of the divorce, and language of the decree contemplating her 
future income. 
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and pointed out that the income shown in his June 1992 trial 
exhibit was overstated because it included the money borrowed 
from her mother. Even if Jack's claim is true, the undisputed 
facts remain that, at the time of the divorce, alimony and child 
support were not enough to cover Diane's monthly living expenses, 
she was not awarded any income producing assets, Jack had her 
business records showing income, Diane had been in practice the 
previous eight months, and the alimony agreement centers its 
provisions around Diane's income from her law practice. 
Consequently, even though this issue of fact exists, it is 
immaterial to the resolution of this case. 
Another issue that Jack raises is his contention that Diane 
earns enough money to provide for her own support.8 This issue 
centers on Jack's claim that Diane's current monthly expenses are 
beyond the standard of living enjoyed by the parties during their 
marriage because they include a $385 car payment. He claims that 
without this expense, her current monthly expenses are $1,737 and 
that Diane makes enough to provide for these expenses. Even 
though there may be a genuine issue concerning the $385 car 
payment as it pertains to the standard of living Diane enjoyed in 
8However, the decree provides that Jack must not only show 
that Diane can provide for her own support, he must also show 
that there has been a substantial change of circumstances. As 
set forth under Point II, Jack has not shown any substantial 
change in Diane's circumstances that was not contemplated at the 
time of the divorce. 
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the marriage, this issue is immaterial to resolution of the case. 
It is undisputed that Diane had to replace her 12 year old 
Buick because it became unreliable. Jack claims that Diane could 
have found a cheaper car for around $10,000, thereby reducing her 
car payments. However, the $1,737 he claims should be Diane's 
monthly expenses does not allow for any gas, maintenance or any 
other car payment. Jack came up with $1,737 by not only 
deducting the $385 car payment, he also deducted all expenses for 
gas and maintenance, except for $100 per month. Even taking 
Jack's assertions as true, amounts must be added back in for a 
replacement vehicle and associated gas and maintenance increasing 
Diane's monthly expenses under Jack's scenario to around $2,000 
per month, depending upon the amount Jack would consider 
reasonable for the replacement vehicle. Her average monthly 
income for 1993 and 1994, plus child support, is still 
insufficient to provide for these expenses. Consequently, while 
Jack may claim a genuine issue as to Diane's monthly car expense, 
this issue is immaterial to the resolution of the case because, 
even taken as true, he cannot show a substantial change of 
circumstances or that Diane can provide for her own support. 
Jack also asserts that Diane's purchase of her 1992 used 
Ford Explorer is beyond the standard of living of the parties. 
This assertion, however, is simply a bare allegation, not 
supported by the undisputed facts. Both parties admit that, 
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during their marriage, they purchased many vehicles including, 
but not limited to, a brand new AMC Javelin, a Triumph TR-7 which 
was only 1 or 2 years old, a relatively new Ford Thunderbird, and 
a new Hyundai Excel bought of the showroom floor. Diane's 
purchase of her used 1992 Ford Explorer is not inconsistent with 
these undisputed facts. Jack's assertion otherwise is a bare 
allegation contrary to the facts and immaterial to a resolution 
of this case. 
In light of the undisputed financial facts, Jack has not 
shown any genuine issue of material fact which, when viewed in 
his favor, would establish a substantial change of circumstances 
not contemplated at the time of the divorce, or that would 
establish that Diane has the ability to support herself. Her 
current income is not significantly different from the income 
Jack attributed to her in his June, 1992 trial exhibit, or her 
actual 1992 income. Those facts that Jack contends were 
genuinely disputed, taken as a whole, do not preclude the entry 
of summary judgment because they are immaterial to resolution of 
the case. Diane's practice is simply not stable enough, nor does 
it produce enough income, for Diane to meet her reasonable 
monthly expenses, even after taking Jack's assertions as true. 
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IV. THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN FINDING THAT JACK'S 
LITIGATION WAS WITHOUT MERIT, BROUGHT IN 
BAD FAITH AND IN AWARDING ATTORNEY FEES TO DIANE. 
Utah Code Anno. § 78-27-56 (1953), as amended provides: 
In civil actions, the court shall award reasonable 
attorney's fees to a prevailing party if the court 
determines that the action or defense to the action was 
without merit and not brought or asserted in good 
faith, except under Subsection (2). 
This Court addressed this statute in the case Utah Dep't of 
Social Services v. Adams, 806 P.2d 1193, 1197 (Utah App. 1991) 
and stated: 
An award of attorney fees premised on a finding of bad 
faith is, to an extent, a matter within the discretion 
of the trial court, and appellate deference is owed to 
the trial judge who actually presided over the 
proceeding and has first-hand familiarity with the 
litigation. 
(citation omitted). 
This Court also held in the case Hermes Associates v. Park's 
Sportsman, 813 P.2d 1221, 1225 (Utah App. 1991) that three 
requirements must be met before the court can award attorney fees 
under this section: "(1) the party must prevail, (2) the claim 
asserted by the opposing party must be without merit, and (3) the 
claim must not be brought or asserted in good faith." 
This Court further explained these requirements and the 
standard of review in the case Jeschke v. Willis. 811 P.2d 202 
(Utah App. 1991). In that case, this Court held: 
To prove that a claim is "without merit" under the 
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statute, the party asserting an award of attorney fees 
must first demonstrate that the claim is "frivolous" or 
"of little weight or importance having no basis in law 
or fact." Cadv v. Johnson, 671 P.2d 149, 151 (Utah 
1983) . The "without merit" determination is a question 
of law, and therefore we review it for correctness. See 
Comment, Attorney's Fees in Bad Faith, Meritless 
Actions, 1984 Utah L. Rev. 593, 598. Second, the party 
must prove that the plaintiff's conduct in bringing the 
suit was lacking in good faith. This lack of good faith 
turns on subjective intent, and for purposes of the 
statute, is synonymous with a finding of "bad faith." 
Cady, 671 P.2d at 151-52; Taylor v. Estate of Taylor, 
770 P.2d 163, 171 (Utah Ct. App. 1989). A finding of 
bad faith is a question of fact and is reviewed by this 
court under the "clearly erroneous" standard. See, 
e.g., Topik v. Thurber, 739 P.2d 1101, 1104 & n. 5 
(Utah 1987); cf. Canyon Country Store v. Bracey, 781 
P.2d 414, 421 (Utah 1989) (determination of bad faith 
reviewed for an abuse of discretion). 
811 P.2d at 203-204. 
In this case, the trial found that Jack's action was without 
merit and in bad faith and awarded attorney fees to Diane. (R. 
724-726) The facts concerning Jack's litigation establish each 
of the elements necessary for an award of attorney fees under 
Section 78-27-56. These facts consist of the following: 
1. Diane prevailed. 
2. After the decree was entered, Jack harassed and 
threatened Diane, forcing her to obtain a restraining order. 
Jack threatened that his payment of alimony was immoral and that 
he "would end it once and for all, you're going to make me do 
something insane. Watch your back." 
3. The decree was entered September 23rd, 1992, after final 
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settlement negotiations on September 1st, 1992. The decree 
explicitly provided that Jack was only entitled to Diane's 
records from her law practice every six months. Yet, only one 
month after entry of the decree, Jack made demand for her 
records. He then filed a motion four months after the decree was 
entered to compel the production of her records, resulting in 
sanctions being assessed against him for a spurious action. 
4. Diane produced her records in March, 1993, after Jack 
made another demand. Then Jack filed his petition to terminate 
the alimony only eight and one half months after the decree was 
entered. 
5. While Jack contends on appeal that the issue of 
reduction of alimony should have been considered, he never 
considered reduction before the trial court and consistently 
insisted on complete, retroactive termination. His only offer to 
Diane during the litigation was termination of alimony, in 
exchange for which he would not seek retroactive termination. At 
the pretrial conference Commissioner Evans recommended that the 
alimony be reduced $80 to $100 per month. Jack absolutely 
refused to consider a reduction, insisting on complete 
termination, even though Diane later indicated her willingness to 
follow Commissioner Evan's recommendation and reduce the alimony 
$80 per month. (R. 390, 561) In his cross motion for summary 
judgment, the only relief Jack sought was complete termination of 
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alimony. (R. 493) 
6. Jack objects to the payment of alimony because he feels 
like he is being forced to finance Dianefs fledgling law 
practice, despite the fact that she was married to Jack for 
nineteen years and did not worked for fifteen years. Jack does 
not like the settlement agreement because it includes alimony and 
he is now sorry that he agreed to pay it. (R. 497-498) 
7. The plain language of the decree and the factual 
circumstances concerning Diane's law practice clearly show that 
her income from her practice was contemplated by the parties and 
in the decree. Yet Jack continues to press the untenable 
position that her income from her practice was never 
contemplated. 
8. During the litigation, Jack refused to reasonable 
cooperate in Diane's discovery requests. 
9. During the litigation, Jack refused to honor a written 
agreement and a court order designed to remedy his refusal to 
completely answer Diane's discovery and expedite the case. 
10. During the litigation, Jack falsified his 1993 tax 
returns and W-2 and filed a false financial declaration with the 
court, signed under oath. 
11. Jack went through multiple attorneys during the 
litigation. 
12. Jack did not pursue any discovery on his own behalf 
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until one year and two months after he filed his petition• 
Based upon the foregoing, all the necessary requirements 
under Section 78-27-56 for an award of attorney fees have been 
met. Diane prevailed in the action. The claim was without 
merit. The undisputed facts and the clear language of the decree 
show that Diane's income from her law practice was contemplated. 
Moreover, the undisputed financial facts show that a substantial 
change of circumstances has not occurred since entry of the 
decree and that Diane cannot presently provide for her own full 
support. In fact, Jack admits that the alimony was to provide 
her assistance in establishing a stable practice and assisting 
her transition into her career as an attorney. Lastly, the 
action was brought in bad faith as shown by Jack's threats, his 
regret at having agreed to the payment of alimony, and his 
actions to obtain records and bring his action with the intent to 
terminate alimony altogether almost immediately after entry of 
the decree. Jack clearly did not intend to honor the alimony 
agreement. Instead, he wanted to terminate alimony altogether as 
soon after the decree was entered as possible. 
The trial court's determination that Jack's action was 
without merit and not brought in good faith is not clearly 
erroneous. The trial court did not err in awarding attorney fees 
to Diane. 
Jack also contends that the award of attorney fees to Diane 
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was inappropriate because she did not incur any fees. Diane and 
her attorney entered into an agreement to trade services at the 
rate of $100 per hour. Diane represented her attorney in his 
divorce. The time she incurred on his behalf was 28 hours, the 
equivalent of $2,800. This has been offset dollar for dollar 
against the time that Diane's attorney has incurred in this case. 
However, that time has far exceeded the 28 hours Diane traded and 
she is now indebted to her attorney for the amount of time he has 
incurred in excess of the 28 hours. 
The trade of services is a legitimate transaction for 
valuable consideration. In the case DeMentas v. Estate of Jack 
Tallas, 764 P.2d 628 (Utah App. 1988), this Court affirmed the 
general definition of valuable consideration. That definition is 
that valuable consideration is any legal detriment bargained for 
and exchanged for a promise. This Court further affirmed the 
rule that there is valuable consideration whenever a promisor 
receives a benefit or where the promisee suffers a detriment, 
however slight. 
In this case Diane suffered a detriment of significant value 
by representing her attorney in his divorce. This is time that 
Diane would otherwise have spent representing a paying client. 
Her attorney suffered a detriment of significant value by 
representing Diane, instead of representing a paying client. In 
fact, she is now accruing an attorney fee debt after crediting 28 
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hours against the time her attorney has incurred in this case. 
In addition, both Diane and her attorney received the benefit of 
representation in their respective case. There is no question 
that the bargain between Diane and her attorney is supported by 
consideration of significant value which provides a legitimate 
basis for the trial court's determination that Diane has incurred 
attorney fees in her case. 
CONCLUSION 
Based upon all of the foregoing, Diane respectfully prays 
that the trial court's summary judgment and award of attorney 
fees in her favor be affirmed and that the denial of Jack's 
cross-motion for summary judgment and Jacks' request for an award 
of attorney fees also be affirmed. Diane further prays for an 
award of her costs and attorney fees on appeal and that the 
calculation of her attorney fees be remanded to the trial court, 
in accordance with this Court's ruling in the case Utah Dep't of 
Social Services v. Adams, 806 P.2d 1193. 
DATED this 9th day of August, 1995. 
JOHNX. RICE 
Attorney for Diane S. Jones 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on this 9th day of August, 1995, I 
caused two true and correct copies of the foregoing to be hand 
delivered to the following: 
Jeff B. Skoubye 
8282 South State Street, Suite 18 
Midvale, Utah 84047 
JOJHtf K. RICE 
^ t f to rney f o r A p p e l l e e 
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